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CASE COMMENTS
not to protect the insured while driving his spouse's automobile as a
temporary substitute.
46
It is difficult to make the temporary substitute provision entirely
clear and definite. It is submitted that the provision is desirable and
necessary as it enables the insured or his permittee to continue to
drive while the described automobile is temporarily disabled. Certain
restrictions in the provision are also desirable and necessary, however,
as they enable the insurer to establish a premium appropriate for
coverage and prevent the insured from misusing the provision to
obtain free coverage on additional automobiles he owns.
GEORGE W. AVOOTEN
LIMITING INSTRUCTIONS IN JOINT CRIMINAL TRIALS
In a criminal trial involving several defendants, it is said that
"one of the most recurring of the difficulties pertains to incriminating
declarations by one or more of the defendants that are not admissible
against others. The dilemma is usually resolved by admitting such
evidence against the declarant but cautioning the jury against its use
in determining the guilt of the others."1 Although the theory that
this limiting instruction will negate the prejudice created by the admis-
sion of the confession has been called a "naive assumption ... [which]
all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction, ' 2 this practice
is sanctioned.3 Its justification has been said to be that it "furthers,
rather than impedes, the search for truth.' 4 The problem is essentially
to protect the nonconfessing defendant by insulating him from preju-
dicial implication; and, at the same time, to protect the public interest
by continuing the use of joint trials without excluding competent
evidence against the confessor. 5
"The modified temporary substitute provision has been construed as not ex-
tending coverage when the insured uses a temporary substitute owned by a spouse.
Samples v. Georgia Mut. Ins. Co., 11o Ga. App. 297, 138 S.E.2d 463 (1964).
1Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 247 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
'Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949)-
3Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232 (1957); 4 Wigmore, Evidence §
1079(d) (3d ed. 1940).
"In effect, however, the rule probably furthers, rather than impedes, the
search for truth, and this perhaps excuses the device which satisfies form while it
violates substance; that is, the recommendation to the jury of a mental gymnastic
which is beyond, not only their powers, but also anybody's else." Nash v. United
States, 54 F.2d soo6, 1oo7 (2d Cir. 1932).
rPeople v. Skelly, 409 Ill. 613, ioo N.E.2d 915, 920 (1951).
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The effect of a limiting instruction against the misuse of a con-
fession implicating nonconfessing co-defendants was questioned in
Oliver v. United States.6 Defendants Crump, Oliver, Mason and Wil-
liams were indicted and jointly tried for the rape of a fourteen year
old girl. There was no motion for severance. The victim testified as to
the incident and identified the defendants as her assailants. Her tes-
timony was corroborated by that of (i) her father, mother, and a
neighbor who described her disheveled condition when found near
the scene of the crime; (2) a doctor who examined the victim; and
(3) a witness from the Federal Bureau of Investigation who examined
the victim's clothes.
Crump made a written confession of the rape. The other three de-
fendants made oral admissions to police officers of their participation
in the crime. Later, all four men denied making any admissions. Over
the objection of the defense, the trial judge admitted Crump's written
confession, which implicated the others, and gave a limiting instruc-
tion to the jury to disregard the references to the other defendants.7
Crump's entire confession was then read to the jury. Crump, Oliver,
and Williams were found guilty as charged; and Mason was con-
victed of assault with intent to commit rape.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit affirmed Crump's conviction, but reversed the con-
victions of Oliver, Mason and Williams. Relying on Kramer v. United
States,8 the court reasoned that when it is possible to delete the names
of the nonconfessing co-defendants without weakening the confession
as to the declarant, it is prejudical error 9 to admit the entire con-
fession without deleting the hearsay references to the co-defendant, and
that a limiting instruction cannot repair the damaging impact of
such references.10
One judge dissented," contending that all four convictions should
be affirmed because the limiting instruction was sufficient to protect
the non-confessors from prejudice, especially when the other evidence
6335 F.2d 724 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
'Counsel for the defense made a general objection, but did not specifically
request deletion. The trial judge gave a limiting instruction, and as the confession
was read, defense counsel again objected. The judge repeated that the entire con-
fession should be read to the jury, but it could only be used against the declarant.
Oliver v. United States, supra note 6, at 727.
8317 F.2d 114, 117 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
'Supra. note 6, at 728, citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 52 (a). This rule does not
require reversal for "harmless error."
1°Supra note 6, at 728,
!Ibid,
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overwhelmingly established their guilt. Another judge would have
reversed all four convictions on the ground that the defendants were
arrested without probable cause, and that confessions obtained dur-
ing a period of illegal detention are inadmissible in evidence.12
In a joint trial, when there is a confession by one defendant which
implicates nonconfessing co-defendants, the court may employ one of
several methods regarding that confession: (i) admit the entire con-
fession into evidence with a limiting instruction to the jury that it is
to be considered only in determining the guilt of the declarant; 13 (2)
either admit the confession but delete the name or reference to the
nonconfessor,14 or substitute an "X" for his name15 (3) limit the pro-
secution to evidence which is admissible against all defendants or,
failing to agree to do so, requiring prosecution of each defendant
separately;' 6 or (4) order a severance.17
(i) Admission of the entire confession with a limiting instruction
is the general rule. It has a dual purpose. It promotes efficient and
effective administration of criminal justice through elimination of ex-
pensive individual litigation. It is also thought sufficient to protect the
nonconfessors from the prejudicial effect of being implicated by the
confession.' s While proponents of the general rule are aware that
its application may involve prejudice to the nonconfessor's cause, they
contend that the prejudicial effect is eliminated or diminished by a
limiting instruction to the jury.19
The opponents of the general rule contend that a limiting instruc-
tion does not sufficiently protect the right of the defendant to have
his guilt determined solely on the basis of the evidence against him.
This is because it exacts of the jury a task which it cannot possibly
perform-that of disregarding a reference in the confession to a co-de-
'2Supra note 6, at 729.
"E.g., United States v. Klein, 3o6 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1962); State v. Sanchez, 59
Ariz. 426, 129 P.2d 932 (1942).
"Kramer v. United States, supra note 8, at 117; People v. Buckminster, 274 111.
435, 113 N.E. 713, 715-16 (1916).
I'Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 411-12 (1945).
1 Delli Paoli v. United States, supra note i.
"Delli Paoli v. United States, supra note i. See also State v. Francis, 152 S.C. 17,
149 S.E. 348 (1929); Annot., 7o A.L.R. 1171 (1931).
"United States v. Cafaro, 26 F.R.D. 170, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).11Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 238 (1957); Blumenthal v. United
States, 332 U.S. 539, 559-60 (1947); United States v. Leviton, 193 F.2d 848, 855-56
(2d Cir. 1951); People v. Rhinehart, 196 Cal. App. 2d 240, 16 Cal. Rptr. 391, 393
(Dist. Ct. App. 1961); People v. Skelly, supra note 5, at 9o; State v. Smith, aol
Wis. 8, 229 N.W. 51, 52 (i93o); accord, United States v. Sansone, 2o6 F.ad 86, 88
715-16 (1916).
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fendant on trial for the same crime. 20 Furthermore, once the confes-
sion is introduced, the limiting instruction may be even more damag-
ing than if not given, because it further emphasizes the co-defendant's
alleged connection with the crime.
21
Although recognizing the dangerous possibility that a jury may
establish the nonconfessor's guilt by inference or transference, 22 courts
adhering to the general rule contend that a basic premise of the Anglo-
American jury trial system is that the jury takes the law from the
judge, and that unless we can assume that the jury follows the proper
instructions of the court, the jury trial system has a fatal defect.
23
(2) Deletion or substitution2 4 may be available when the result
will be an effective confession against the declarant without render-
ing the confession unintelligible.25 This solution is available only when
the reference to the nonconfessor is not organically interwoven with
the declarant's admission of guilt.26
One objection to this procedure is that the confessing defendant
has the right to have the confession read into evidence exactly as he
"'The fact of the matter is that too often such admonition against misuse
is intrinsically ineffective in that the effect of such an inadmissible declaration
cannot be wiped from the brains of the jurors." Delli Paoli v. United States, 352
U.S. 232, 247 (1957) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting).
-"Kramer v. United States, 317 F.2d 114, 117 (D.C. Cir. 1963); United States v.
Gordon, 253 F.2d 177, 183 (Tth Cir. 1958); Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1oo6,
1007 (2d Cir. 1932); Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 44o (1949) (concurring
opinion).
A study at the University of Chicago law school revealed the following: "A
moot case was played on tape to thirty moot juries. In ten of the cases defendant
reveals he has no liability insurance, but no objection taken to this disclosure; the
mean award of all verdicts was $33,ooo. In another ten the defendant reveals he has
liability insurance, and again no objection is taken and no further attention is
paid; the mean award was $37,000. In the remaining ten the defendant reveals
his liability insurance, objection is taken, and the jury is instructed to disregard
insurance; the mean award was $46,ooo. A conscious attempt to follow the limiting
instruction apparently was made: In the ten cases where insurance was disclosed
but no instruction given there were 61 references to insurance in the jury deliber-
ations, 46% carrying an implication for raising damages; where the limiting in-
struction was given, there were only 36 references to insurance, 19% of which
carried an implication for raising damages." Comment, 24 U. Chi. L. Rev. 710, 713
n.21 (1957).
2 Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 559-6o (1947); People v. Skelly,
supra note 5, at 920.
-'Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 242 (1957).
2 Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 194 (1953); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S.
401, 410-411 (1945).
2Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 412 (1945); Kramer v. United States,
317 F.2d 114, 117 (D.C. Cir. 1963); People v. Buckminster, 274 Ill. 435, 113 N.E. 713,
715-6 (1916).
rPeople v. Buckminster, 274 Ill. 435, 113 N.E. 713, 715-16 (1916); Kramer v.
United States, 317 F.2d 114, 117 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
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made it; otherwise it is not his confession.2 7 A more realistic objec-
tion is that deletion may arouse speculation in the minds of the jurors
who may infer that the deleted segment implicates a co-defendant. As
stated in the Oliver case, excision of any reference to the nonconfessor
may arouse speculation in the minds of the jurors, but "the objective
is to do the best that can be done to avoid risk of prejudice even
though no steps can perfectly eliminate it."2 If the reference to the
nonconfessor is deleted, the risk of prejudice to him is substantially
reduced without impeding the prosecution of the confessor.
(3) A third possible alternative is to present the prosecution with
the choice of either limiting its case to evidence admissible against all
defendants or, failing to do so, prosecuting each defendant separately.2 9
This solution is not often used. The effect of such a choice would be to
force the prosecution to try the confessor separately or be deprived of
the use of his confession against him. This alternative seems to be
unduly harsh for the prosecution, and it is basically subject to the
same criticism as severance since the two are closely related.
(4) The fourth alternative is severance, which is directed solely at
the protection of nonconfessing defendants 3 0 Severance, which pro-
vides separate trials for nonconfessing defendants, appears to be the
ideal solution, but in conspiracy trials31 where there are numerous
defendants, it is costly and time consuming. In addition, separate
trials are often impractical when the acts and subject matter on trial
are closely related. With the impracticalities of separate trials, courts
'14 Wigmore, Evidence § 1o79()(d) (3 d ed. 194o); "The rule is very clear that
the confession must be given as made. If we strike out any part, then the confession
ceases to be the confession as made. The rule in such cases is clearly to let all the
defendant said be given, and the jury cautioned not to consider it against any one,
except the man who makes it." State v. Jeffards, 121 S.C. 443, 114 S.E. 415 (1922).
-Oliver v. United States, 335 F.2d 724, 728 (D.C. Cir. 1964). It has also been
held that refusal to grant deletion of the nonconfessor's name is not error. People
v. Roxborough, 307 Mich. 575, 12 N.V.2d 466, 470 (1943).
" E.g., People v. Skelly, 4o9 Ill. 613, oo N.E.2d 915 (1951); People v. Barbaro,
395 Ill. 246, 69 N.E.2d 692 (1946); see also Rex v. Martin, 9 Ont. L.R. 218 (1905);
4 Ann. Cas. 91, 918 (1907). Annot., 70 A.L.R. 1171, 1186 (1931). Cf. United States
v. Leviton, 193 F.2d 848, 856 (2d Cir. 1951), where the general rule was upheld
even when the prosecution stated that short of severance, nothing would insulate
the co-defendant from implication spelled out in the confession of another de-
fendant.
0Kramer v. United States, 317 F.2d 114, 117 (D.C. Cir. 1963); United States
v. Gottfried, 165 F.2d 36o (2d Cir. 1948); People v. Btckminster, 274 Ill. 435, 113
N.E. 713, 715-16 (1916); Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 247 (1957)
(dissenting opinion).
'Comment, 56 Colum. L. Rev. 1112 (1956).
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must consider that in many such cases the possibility of prejudice is
very limited and does not require severance.
32
In advocating the severance alternative, Justice Frankfurter main-
tained that the prosecution should not have the "windfall of having
the jury be influenced by evidence against a defendant which, as a
matter of law, they should not consider but which they cannot put out
of their minds."
38
In a majority of states, 4 severance is within the discretion of the
trial judge, and his decision will not be overturned absent a clear
showing of abuse of discretion. 5
In a number of states, a right of severance is given by statute.8 6
Since either the nature of many crimes or other practical reasons often
dictate joint trials, the usual procedure, where severance is discre-
tionary, is to deny separate trials unless actual prejudice is shownaT
The question of which alternative presents the best solution to
the problem of admitting implicating confessions is subject to conflict-
ing opinion. It is submitted that severance is the ideal solution, but
that it is sometimes impractical. 38 Deletion may arouse speculation;
but it is not a radical departure from the general rule, and it may
be satisfactory in most cases.
The general rule may present the only practical solution in an at-
tempt to balance the interest of both state and defendant. This solu-
"E.g., Maupin v. United States, 225 F.2d 68o (loth Cir. 1955); United States v.
Hall, 126 F. Supp. 620 (D.D.C. 1955). But see Schaffer v. United States, 221 F.2d
17 (5 th Cir. 1955); United States v. Haupt, 136 F.2d 661 (7 th Cir. 1943).
"Delli Paoli v. United States, supra note 1, at 248.
'E.g., Alaska R. Crim. P. 14 (1963); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-1801, 1802 (1964);
Cal. Pen. Code § igo8; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 918.02 (1944); Hawaii Rev. Laws § 258-18
(1955); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 114-8 (Smith-Hurd 1964); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-1804
(1956); Iowa Code Ann. § 780.1 (1946); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 62-1429 (1949); La.
Rev. Stat. § 15:316 (1950); Mich. Comp. Laws § 768.5 (1948); Minn. Stat. Ann.
§ 631.o3 (1945); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 545.880 (1959); N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 391; N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 1-179 (1951); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 136.o6o (1963); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, § 785
(1964)-
"Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 95 (1954); 5 Wharton, Criminal Law and
Procedure § 1944 (12th ed. 1957).
ME.g., Ala. Code tit. 15, § 319 (1958); Ga. Code Ann. § 27-2101 (1953); Miss. Code
Ann. § 2514 (1956) (applicable only to felonies); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2002 (1956)
(applicable only to felonies); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 65o (1948); Vt. Stat. Ann.
tit. 13, § 6507 (1959) (discretionary unless the felony is punishable with death or
more than five years imprisonment); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-230 (1957) (applicable only
to felonies).
-United States v. Cafaro, 26 F.R.D. 170, 172 (S.D.N.Y. i96o); 5 Wharton, Crim-
inal Law and Procedure § 1944 (12th ed. 1957).
"United States v. Cafaro, 26 F.R.D. 170, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 196o).
